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In the Supreme Court of the . ~ .. ·:·· , .. · 
. ··"' State of Utah : ~·:.:-.: 
WANDA CARTER, 
Plaintiff and Rssponden.t, 
vs. 
ERCIL V. CARTER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
REPLY BRIEF 
DAVE McMULLIN 
20 Ea$1: Utah Avenue 
Payson, Utah 
Attorney for Plamtift· 
Respondent 
----
In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
WANDA CARTER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
ERCIL V. CARTER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
REPLY BRIEF 
CASE 
NO. 10751 
In the respondent's brief, ~ent has referred to 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order Modi-
fying Decree which were not sent to the Supreme Court 
with the Appellant's Designation of Record on Appeal. 
Since the respondent has chosen to raise these matters by 
his brief, we have deemed it important to send these docu-
ments to ·the Supreme Court. 
The fact of the matter is that at 1Jhe time of the 
Amended Decree, the defendant was brought into Court 
on an order to show cause and the show cause order was 
related to the support of a child that had been born to the 
parties, subsequent to the divorce. This fact is refe?Ted 
to in the Statement of Facts in the appellant's Brief. 
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At that time the undersigned, counsel for the defend-
ant, did not have available to him a copy of the original 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree, how-
ever, it was agre2d by the respective parties that the orig-
inal decree of divorce could remain in effect and that addi-
tional provision would be added providing for the support 
of the child, Cory C. Carter, and also providing forr reason-
able rights of visitation with the child by the defendant, 
his father. No court record was made of the stipulation. 
Counsel for the plaintiff took considerable liberty with 
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Modi-
fying the Decree. At that time, counsel for the plaintiff, 
who was a lawyer other than the present counsel for the 
plaintiff, stated in the order modifying the decree as fol-
lows: "That the defendant is hereby ordered to vacate 
the residence and property of the parties which has here-
tofore been awarded to the plaintiff and located at 1891 
West 600 South Street in Provo, Utah, and that the plain-
tiff herein shall have the peaceful use and possession of the 
said residence, together with the household furniture, fur-
nishings and supplies located in the house, except for the 
personal tools and effects of the defendant herein." 
At the argument of these matters to Judge Tuckett 
and to Judge Sorensen, I was very clear in stating to both 
Judges that the insertion of this language in the modified 
decree was done by counsel without knowledge to me of 
the exact terms and conditions of the original decree. I 
assumed that counsel was accurate in stating that the prop-
erty had heretofore been awarded to the plaintiff and I 
was probably negligent in not checking the original decree 
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to make sure that the language contained therein was com-
pata:ble with the language in the order modifying the decree. 
Regardless of the reasons for the insertion of the 
language above stated, it is the position of the appellant 
that the insertion of said language did not alter the con.di 
tions of the original decree, for the following rea,sons: 
1. The plaintiff, in her affidavit for order to show 
cause, respecting the modification of the decree, requested 
only that the decree be modified as follows: "That the ali-
mony and support money for the plaintiff and one minor 
child be increased from $60.00 per month to $200.00 per 
month, a restraining order against the defendant from 
harming and molesting the plaintiff in any manner in her 
residence, and awarding to the plaintiff the 1956 Chevrolet 
automobile." This was the only pleading upon which the 
order modifying decree was entered and at that time the 
decree was entered merely to provide for support of the 
minor child born after the divorce. Counsel for the plain-
tiff, in making findings and an order in excess of his plead-
ing, did not, by doing so, modify the original decree. 
2. The language of the modification does not state in 
effect that the property is now transferred to the plaintiff, 
but rather states "which has heretofore been awarded to 
the plaintiff," which statement is categorically contrary to 
fact and categorically contrary to the original decree. 
The appellant respectfully states that the plaintiff can-
not, by this language, modify the terms of the original de-
cree wherein it was the intent of both parties merely to 
provide for support of the minor child. Your appellant 
further believes that the language inserted was inserted 
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by counsel for the plaintiff erroneously and not with intent 
to change the provisions of the original decree. The un-
dersigned believes that such language was inserted upon 
the mistaken ·belief by then counsel for the plaintiff that 
the original decree had, in fact, awarded 1Jhe property to 
the plaintiff. 
As the matter now stands, we are meed with a dilemma 
that has not been corrected by the arguments and litiga-
tion had m the Court ·below. The question is, what does 
the Decree mean and what is an equitable solution to the 
property question. 
Respectfully, 
JACKSON B. HOWARD 
I 
I 
